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The Disruption of a Solidly Democratic State: 
Civil Rights and South Carolina 
Electoral Change , 1948-1972 
ALEC PETER LAMIS 
Vanderbilt University 
Between 1948 and 1972, South Caro lina's normal pattern of voting in 
presidential elections und erwent a realignment. From a solidly Democratic 
state that had not given the Democratic nominee less than 87 percent of its 
votes before 1948, South Caro lina became a stron ghold for Republican presi-
dential candidates. 
The purpose of this article is to analyze the factors that caused this 
realignment. The study contends that the abandonment of the "Southern 
position" on the racial issue by the national Democratic party and the ensuing 
promotion of civil rights by two Democratic Administrations comprise the 
major causal factors involved in thi s realignment . 1 
The bitter controversy over civil righ ts in the Democratic party that was 
manifest at th e 1948 national convention had its roots in the ear ly 1930s. One 
could go back to th e Civil War or to the time of John C . Calhoun or to the 
beginning of slavery in North America; for the purposes of th is study, the New 
Deal era is sufficient. An incident that illustrates what was to befall the 
Democratic party occurred on the floor of the U.S. Senate in 1938 when an 
anti- lynching proposal sponsored by Northern Democrats was under debate. 
Sen . James F . Byrnes of South Carolina reminded his listeners that a similar 
proposal had been sponsored in 1921 by Republican congressmen and at the 
time had been defeated with the aid of Northern Democrats. The reversal on 
the issue among Northern Democrats , he said , had come about because "90 
percent of the Negroes in the North ... are voting for Democratic candi-
dates . "2 (The economic appeal of the ew Deal had undermined the tradi-
tional Republican loyalty of black voters outside the South. ) Byrnes hinted 
that though the South "had never voted for a Republican candidate," it might 
have to reappraise the situation. It is clear , he said, that "the white peopl e in 
the South in supporting the Democratic party [had been guided by] the belief 
1 The emphasis on the civil rights issue is not to be interpreted as a total exclusion of 
economic class variab les. James L. Sundquist's treatment of the South during these decades as 
exhibiting delayed reaction to the party realignment begun in the rest of the nation in the 1930s is 
a useful framework and one that does not contradi ct the emp hasis of this study on the civil rights 
split in the Democra tic party as paramount . South Carolina's preoccupation with race over-
shadowed the ongoing pull toward economic class voting begun by the New Deal. See Sundquist, 
Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States 
(Washington: The Brookings Institution , 1973), especially Chapter 12, "Aftershocks of the New 
Deal Earthquake - in the South," pp. 245-274. 
2 George Mowry , Another Look at the Twentieth-Century South (Baton Rouge, La.: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1973), pp. 69-70. 
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that when problems affecting the Negro and the very soul of the South arose, 
they could depend upon the Democrats of the North to rally to their sup-
port .... "3 
In 1947, President Truman appointed a civil rights commission to study 
the condition of the Negro. Its recommendations were "a sweeping denuncia-
tion of all governmental and of some private sanctions of race discrimination or 
segregation." 4 Truman called the report "an American charter of human 
freedom" and implemented many of its suggestions within his authority, such 
as integrating military units. 5 
IN SEARCH OF AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE DEMOCRATS 
The link between the 1948 Dixiecrat campaign and the civil rights position 
of President Truman and the national Democratic convention of 1948 is so 
clear that little elaboration is needed. Gov. Strom Thurmond of South 
Carolina quickly sized up the situation after Truman's civil rights initiatives. 
He told a May 1948 gathering in Mississippi: "The leadership of the Democrat-
ic party may as well realize that the South's electoral votes are no longer in the 
bag for the Democratic nominee. "6 In accepting the States' Rights presiden-
tial nomination , Thurmond declared: "There are not enough laws on the books 
of the nation, nor can there be enough laws, to break down segregation in the 
South." 7 Thurmond swept South Carolina with 72.0 percent of the vote; 
Truman received 24.1; and the Republican nominee, Thomas E. Dewey, 
3.8. 8 
In the years immediately following the 1948 revolt, the speculation con-
cerning what that election meant for the future ran along three lines: 9 
1) It was the beginning of a quadrennial effort to deadlock the electoral 
college and demand concessions to the "Southern point of view." 
2) It was only a temporary bolt that would soon find the traditional 
adherents back in the Democratic party. 
3) It was the beginning of a two-party South. 
As George B. Tindall pointed out, "It proved, in fact, to be all of these 
things. " 10 
3 Ibid. 
4 Francis Butler Simkins and Charles Pierce Roland, A History of the South , 4th ed . ( ew 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), p. 589. 
5 Ibid . 
6 The State (Columbia, S.C .), 11 May 1948. 
7 Ibid ., 18 July 1948. 
8 Svend Petersen , A Statistical History of the American Presidential Elections (New York: 
Frederick Ungar Publishing Co. , 1962). The county-level election results cited throughout were 
obtained in computer-readable form from the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research 
at the University of Michigan, to whom the author expresses his appreciation. 
9 George B. Tindall , The Disruption of the Solid South (New York: W. W. Norton and Co. , 
1972), p. 38. 
10 Ibid . 
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These three contradictory tendencies stand out clearly during the 1952 
and 1956 elections. The shock of finding their traditional arrangement with 
the national Democratic party on segregation abrogated may have led to the 
blind rage of the Thurmond bolt, but the power realities of the situation 
appear to have always been evident to the state's members of Congress. In 
particular , they knew how impotent the civil rights advocates were in the 
Southern-dominated Senate. Through the 1960 election , the state Democrat-
ic leadership managed to prevent any top officeholder from bolting the party 
and , in fact , to win the state in all three elections for the national party 
nominee, if only by slim margins. 
But the triumph of the pragmatic state party leadership during this decade 
was far from apparent in 1952. An examination of positions presented at the 
reconvened state Democratic convention in August 1952, after Gov. Adlai E. 
Stevenson had won the presidential nomination , is instructive. Both of South 
Carolina's United States senators urged the convention to back Stevenson . 
The State11 reported Sen. Burnet R. Maybank told the delegates that remain-
ing with the national party would keep Southern senators in a position where 
they could head off civil rights legislation. Maybank reminded the delegates 
that only acts of Congress, not party platforms, really count. Sen. Olin D. 
Johnston put it this way: 
To me there is absolutely no difference between the aims and desires of 
the civil rights plank for both parties. Both are heading towards the same 
goal . Both have hidden teeth in them. Neither forms the South's view-
point on this matter .... I am sticking to the Democratic nominees of the 
Democratic party. 12 
Other delegates , oflesser status in the state political hierarchy , felt differ-
ently. Francis Coleman , the mayor of Mount Pleasant in Charleston County , 
said: 
How can we subscribe to the policies of the national convention? If we 
endorse the national party platform , it will be a mandate to the U.S. 
Supreme Court to do away with segregation in the South. 13 
Thomas P. Stoney rhetorically asked: 
How can you repudiate a platform and then vote for the men on it? 
. . . Mr. Byrnes says the 1952 civil rights part is stiffer than in 1948, and 
you come with your mouths open and think with your bellies and not with 
your brains . 14 
11 The State, 7 August 1952. 
12 Ibid . 
13 Ibid . 
14 Ibid . 
58 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
Governor Byrnes told the convention it would be wrong not to certify 
Stevenson as the state party's candidate , the purpose for reconvening the 
convention. The convention took the advice of Byrnes and certified the 
national ticket. 15 
Disenchanted Democrats started gathering petitions to secure a ballot 
spot for Eisenhower separate from that of the Republican party . By Labor 
Day, 1952, these "South Carolinians for Eisenhower" had 53,000 signers ; only 
10,000 were needed. 16 
The regular Republican organization in the state was little more than a 
"letterhead " operation. In fact, in 1952, the GOP state chairman held a 
full-time job as chairman of the Board of Public Welfare in Washington , D.C. 
His South Carolina residence consisted of a room he maintained in his 
mother's house in Pickens County .17 
In mid-September , Governor Byrnes announced he would support 
Eisenhower. He gave a number of reasons , including Eisenhower 's stature as 
a world leader. Among his stated reasons was the following: 
The civil rights legislation advocated by the Democratic administra-
tion has not seriously disturbed many well informed people in the South . 
They realize tl1ose bills could not be passed as long as in the United States 
Senate there was no limit on debate . ... Stevenson now states that while 
he could not make the decision , as President he would use all of his 
influence to "encourage Congress " to put an end to unlimited debate .18 
Shortly after Byrnes' statement , Eisenhower visited the state capital, an event 
heralded as the first campaign visit ever of a presidential nominee of either 
party to South Carolina. During his speech , Eisenhower made no mention of 
civil rights. 19 
Eisenhower received 46.4 percent of the vote under the Independents ' 
ballot line and 2.8 percent on the GOP line . His 49.2 percent total was still 
5,000 votes short of Stevenson. Behind this strong Eisenhower showing , as 
the statements of state politicians suggested , was the abrupt turn in the 
national Democratic party away from supporting the Southern demand that 
their segregation and subjugation of blacks was no business of the national 
government and its laws. 
Donald S. Strong has shown the importance of Southern urban areas 
voting Republican during the 1950s. 20 This phenomenon of urban Repub-
licanism was present in the state. But, as Figure l shows , Eisenhower ran 
15 Ibid . 
16 The Stat e, 4 Sept ember 1952. 
17 Neal R. Peirce, The Deep South Stat es of America: People, Politics, and Power in the Deep 
South (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1974), p. 400 . 
18 The Stat e, 19 September 1952. 
19 The Stat e, l Octob er 1952. 
20 Donald S. Stron g, Urban Republi canism in the South (University , Ala.: University of 
Alabama , Bureau of Publi c Admini stration , 1960). 
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equally well in both Black Belt and Metro counties , 21 and even in the Middle 
State counties he had a simple majority. Eisenhower's weak showing in the 
Piedmont counties held the state for Stevenson . 
The 1954 Supreme Court decision , led by Eisenhower's appointee as chief 
justice, Earl Warren , outlawing segregated public schools no longer made 
Eisenhower's candidacy the vehicle for protest it had been in 1952, when the 
greatest danger to segregation appeared to come from Northern Democrats. 
The hope of Byrnes for Eisenhower on civil rights had proved unwarranted 
and the former governor turned against both the President and Stevenson in 
1956. 
While the 1952 election highlighted one of the three contradictory ten-
dencies - that South Carolina Democrats could remain loyal to their party , if 
bare! y- the 1956 election demonstrated the force of the other two tendencies 
as well . In newspaper accounts of the 1952 election , Thurmond is hardly 
mentioned , though he attended the Chicago convention. In 1950, he had 
been defeated by Senator Johnston in his bid to unseat the then first-term 
senator in the Democratic primary. In fact, in 1948 when Thurmond began his 
active role defending the South against Trnman's civil rights initiatives , as 
V. 0. Key wrote in 1949, "Sage South Carolina politicians nodded and con-
cluded that Strom was running for the Senate. "22 In 1956, Thurmond was the 
Democratic party's nominee for the U.S. Senate . The fonner bolter showed 
he had a different conception from Johnston and Maybank as to where the 
power of the South lay. Prior to the 1956 national convention , Thurmond said: 
It is the desire of our state to work witl1in the framework of the 
national party witl1out going so far as to destroy the only weapon the 
South has that can bring effective results -fear on the part of the national 
party that the Soutl1 will take independent action .... If the national 
party knows the South will not bolt ... then it is apparent our fight to get 
concessions is lost. 23 
As in 1948 and 1952, South Carolina Democrats in 1956 reconvened tl1eir 
state convention after the national convention. The chief controversy cen-
21 In this study the state 's forty-six counties are divided into four types: Black Belt -
Allendal e, Bamb erg, Calhoun , Clarendon , Colleton , Edgefi eld, Fairfield , Georg etown , 
Hampton , Jasper , Lee , McCormick , Marion , Orangeburg , and Williamsburg- these counties 
contained a egro population of over 50 percent in the 1960 census; Piedmont - Abbevi!Je, 
Anderson , Cherokee , Chest er, Chesterfield , Greenwood , Kershaw , Lancaster, Laurens , New-
berry , Oconee , Pickens , Saluda, Spartanburg , Union, and York- these counties lying above the 
fall line in the Piedmont plateau contain the state's highest percentag e of persons employed in 
manufacturing ; Metro - Charleston , Greenville, and Richland (Columbia ) - the state 's three 
largest urban areas ; and Middle State - Aiken, Barnwell, Beaufort, Berkeley , Darlington , 
Dillon , Dorch ester , Florence , Horry , Lexington, Marlboro , and Sumter - these counties 
represent a middle ground between the heavily manufacturing Piedmont and the high egro 
concentration of the Black Belt. 
22 V. 0. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in Stat e and Nation (New York: Random House, 1949), p. 
150. 
23 Th e State , 22 July 1956. 
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tered on a resolution by Shepard K. Nash of Sumter. The Nash resolution 
stated that any South Carolina Democrat could vote for (and presumably 
endorse or actively campaign for) someone other than the Democratic presi-
dential nominee in the fall and not jeopardize his state party status. This was a 
measure designed by politicians to protect themselves since, obviously , a 
citizen could vote in secret for whomever he chose no matter what the 
convention did on this point. 
U.S. Sen. Thomas A. Wofford, a short-term appointee, speaking against 
the resolution, charged: "Eisenhower has done more damage in three and a 
half years in the South than Mrs. Roosevelt can do in twenty years .... We 
never have in the South gotten anything out of the Republican party. "24 Gov. 
George Bell Timmerman, Jr. , the successor to Byrnes who had recently called 
for federal transportation of Negroes to Northern states, where he said "race 
mixing" was favored , 25 told the convention: "The South made significant gains 
at Chicago , and these gains marked a turning point in political attitudes 
toward the South." Senator Johnston told the convention: "We can best serve 
the people of Sou th Carolina by remaining in the Democratic party. "26 
During a visit to the State House in late October, Johnston put the party 
establishment's argument as explicitly as it appears anywhere in the published 
record: "We can fight for segregation better through the Democratic party 
than in any other way." 27 
Two other statements from the reconvened convention demonsb·ate the 
bitterness present at the gathering. Lonnie A. Causy of Horry County shouted 
at what he called the "Eisenhowercrats" in the balcony to get out. "I came 
here becaus e I love Adlai Stevenson," he exclaimed. Causy promised the 
delegates "to stump South Carolina against Jimmy Byrnes as I did in 1952 
when the state was saved for Stevenson ," and, according to the newspaper 
account, "he jeered at Senator Thurmond as a States' Righter." William T. 
Jones of Greenwood told the delegates , according to The State, that "if they 
couldn't support the nominees of the party they weren 't Democrats . He 
sugges ted that if tl1ey wanted to vote for independents to get into the inde-
pendent party , and, if they wanted to vote for Eisenhower , to get into the 
Republican party." 28 The Nash resolution was defeated 168½ to 147½, and, as 
the election showed, a number of South Carolinians took Jones up on his 
conven tion offer. 
Immediately after the state convention, a hundred delegates met to start a 
ballot petition under the name of "South Carolinians for Independent Elec-
tors." The leadership of this movement was occupied by officials of the State 
Association of(White) Citizens Councils. Farley Smith of Lynchburg , a son of 
24 The State, 28 August 1956. 
25 Simkins and Roland , Histo1·y of the South , p. 596. 
26 The State , 28 August 1956. 
27 The State , 25 October 1956. 
28 The State, 28 August 1956. 
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Sen. Cotton Ed Smith, became chairman of the movement. After securing 
their ballot position, this group - whose blatantly racist appeal needs no 
elaboration - pledged its electors to Sen. Harry F. Byrd of Virginia for 
president and U.S. Rep. John Bell Williams of Mississippi for vice president. 
The Republican party in the state, by now under the leadership of resident 
South Carolinians, several of them retired industrialists, ran an Eisenhower 
campaign that emphasized conservative economic issues. The Democrats, 
likewise, stressed New Deal issues and played down the racial issue in 
handling Stevenson's appeal. 
The returns of this three-way election in the state demonstrate that each of 
the three tendencies cited above and advocated by various political leaders -
stay with the Democrats, join the Republican party, or bolt-all securely tied 
to the impact of outside forces threatening segregation, had sizable support 
among the voters. Stevenson won the state with a plurality of 45.4 percent. 
The Independents for Byrd finished second with 29.5 percent, and the 
Republicans were third with 25.2. The fact that Stevenson nearly held his own 
- in the Piedmont counties he did not drop at all (see Figure 2) - directs 
attention to the massive defection from Eisenhower to the white citizens 
council's slate. As shown in Figure 1, the most dramatic drop in Eisenhower's 
vote from 1952 to 1956 came in the Black Belt counties. Among these coun-
ties, with over 50 percent of their population black, few of whom voted, 
Eisenhower's vote dropped from 62 percent to 17 percent. Even in the Metro 
counties, the decline for Eisenhower was nearly 30 percent. While the 1956 
Eisenhower vote indicated that the GOP was, in a sense, on the rise, it also 
suggested how much of the 1952 Eisenhower vote was a reaction to the 
changing national attitude toward the South's subjugation of the Negro. 
NO CLEAR CHOICE APPEARS 
In the four years leading up to the 1960 election, a number of factors were 
important for discouraging a large exodus from the Democratic party by South 
Carolina's politicians. Because of the one-party system on the state level and 
the rule of seniority in Congress, the state's congressmen and senators held 
important positions of leadership in Washington that would be lost if they 
switched parties. The importance of seniority for tl1e segregation fight was 
constantly emphasized by these politicians. In the state itself, the Democratic 
politicians held "a vested interest in the office-holding industry." 29 And 
finally, the Republican party, the party of Lincoln and Reconstruction, did not 
offer a viable alternative on the race issue. Eisenhower's action in Little Rock 
and his support for civil rights legislation offered no comfort to those South 
Carolinians ready to flock to any candidate who gave them hope of maintaining 
the Negro in an inferior position, that sizable segment that jumped from 
Thurmond to Eisenhower to Byrd in eight yea.rs. 
29 Tindall , Disruption of the Solid South , p. 40. 
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This lack of choice on race was clearly evident in 1960, and this election 
stands out as one in which the civil rights issue does not dominate. The main 
reason: Senator John F. Kennedy and Vice President Richard M. Nixon held 
almost identical civil rights positions. Both men traveled to Columbia, mark-
ing the first time in state history opposing presidential candidates had visited 
the state. (Kennedy's appearance was the first for a Democratic nominee.) 
Two quotations from accounts of their visits show that segregationists received 
no outward comfort from either. Kennedy declared: "Some of you may 
disagree with my views [on civil rights], but at least I have not changed my 
principles in an election year." He added that progress must be made on civil 
rights "if we are to be true to our ideals and responsibilities." Presidential 
leadership would be necessary for such progress, he said, and charged that 
Nixon was double-talking on the issue: "Up there he stresses how quickly he 
will act in this area. Down here he says he knows this is a difficult problem. "30 
The State gave only the following report of Nixon's Columbia mention of the 
issue: 
The Vice President referred only incidentally to civil rights. He said 
he recognized that many in the audience would not agree with all his 
positions. But he said he believed he is respected by Southerners as a 
man "who talks the same way in the West and the South and the North 
and the East. "31 
An indication of how well the two sides balanced their presentations in 
South Carolina can be seen in the election eve announcement of Smith for the 
white citizens council claiming neutrality in the contest and urging voters to 
do what he said Senator Thurmond (who was running that fall for re-election as 
a Democrat) had suggested, "Vote your conscience and for the good of South 
Carolina." The council did list "the positions" of the two sides. The first point 
in their list suggested that perhaps they had a slight preference after all: 
The Democratic platform calls for integration of the races "in all areas 
of community life," which we take to include homes, churches, clubs, 
etc. The Republican platform limits itself to integration of public 
facilities. 32 
Another cue, besides Thurmond and the white citizens council's "neutrality," 
was former Governor Byrnes' endorsement of Nixon at the candidate's State 
House rally. As correlation data presented below show, Nixon's electoral 
support in the state corresponded strongly to that of the Byrd slate. 
During the 1960 campaign, the state's most prominent Democratic of-
ficeholders (except Thurmond) made a vigorous effort for Kennedy. The 
Massachusetts senator's selection of Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas as his 
30 The State, 11 October 1960. 
31 The State, 4 November 1960. 
32 Ibid. 
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running mate was an important concession to Southern Democratic leaders . 
That Kennedy and Johnson - two men who because of their civil rights 
actions in office were to become "traitors " for many white South Carolinians in 
the 1960s - carried South Carolina, if only by a little over two percentage 
points (51.2 to 48.8 ), is a tribute to the traditional pull of party loyalty buoyed 
by the influence of the party leadership , particularly in the Piedmont coun-
ties . The state Democratic leaders were able to accomplish this because the 
Republican presidential candidate offered no clear choice on civil rights. 
When such a choice was offered four years later , despite the last vigorous 
effort for the national ticket by the leadership , traditional Democratic loyalty 
was not enough to win. 
To understand how state leaders were able to hold South Carolina in 1960 
for Kennedy-Johnson , it is important to remember that the electorate did not 
identify the mild civil rights developments of the 1950s with a Democratic 
president. While Truman was an aberration to many South Carolinians , there 
was some reason to hope that the party ofJefferson and Jackson would again be 
led by a man who would treat the South 's racial "institutions " - as Franklin 
Roosevelt had done - as beyond the realm of the federal government's 
responsibility. This was to prove to be wishful thinking , but it was a plausible 
rationalization that may have helped to win the state for Kennedy. 
To follow this one step further , it needs to be emphasized how slowly the 
outside political challenges to segregation in the South were actually affecting 
the dual society there. In 1960, South Carolina treated blacks little better than 
in 1940. The power of the federal government had yet to be brought to bear in 
sufficient strength to effect the changes that were portended by the resolu-
tions of Northern Democrats and the unenforced pronouncements of the 
Supreme Court. 33 
In the Black Belt, Nixon returned to the Republican party much of the 
support lost to the Byrd group, but still ran 8 percent below Eisenhower there 
in 1952. In the Metro counties , the vice president increased slightly on the 
1952 showing of Eisenhower. Again , the Democratic nominee 's victory rested 
on strong support in the Piedmont counties , as is shown by Figure 2. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF GOLDWATER 'S CANDIDACY 
In 1964, many South Carolina voters felt they had a choice on race. 
President Johnson was a powerful force pushing the Civil Rights Bill through 
Congress; Senator Barry Goldwater opposed it. Despite Goldwater's protes-
tation that he was "unalterably opposed to discrimination of any sort" and 
voted against the bill because parts of it "fly in the face of the Constitution, "34 
his vote was heralded in South Carolina by both Republicans and those bolters 
who felt dissatisfied with the lack of choice on the race issue in 1960. Smith of 
33 Simkins and Roland , History of the South, p . 598. 
34 The State, 19 June 1964. 
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the white citizens council asserted: "Independents should join under the 
banner of the Republican party . .. . The issues are clearly drawn . "35 
But in competition with Goldwater and other early Republican "Southern 
strategists," the first years of the 1960s witnessed the rise of a Southern 
segregationist hero who was to become a factor in every presidential race 
starting in 1964, Gov. George Wallace of Alabama. Over 25,000 petition 
signatures had been secured - more than enough - by July 1964 to put 
Wallace on the ballot in South Carolina as an independent presidential 
candidate. But immediately after the Republican party nominated Goldwater, 
Wallace withdrew his candidacy. 36 Goldwater's candidacy forced Wallace out. 
Wallace 's South Carolina supporters issued the following statement after the 
withdrawal: 
And be it resolved that ... knowing that the Democrats sponsored 
the Civil Rights Bill and in view of the fact that Sen. Barry Goldwater 
voted against the Civil Rights Bill ... we , a group of South Carolina 
Independent Democrats , wholeheartedly endorse Sen . Goldwater for 
President .... 37 
The 1964 election was to be the last in which the state's major Democratic 
politicians closed ranks behind a national candidate. Senator Johnston vigor-
ously campaigned for President Johnson , who visited the state. Senator 
Johnston fought the Civil Rights Bill to the end and declared it "unenforce-
able" when the fight was lost. 38 But he stuck by his party loyalty to the extent 
of seconding Senator Humphrey 's vice presidential nomination at the Atlantic 
City convention. 39 Meanwhile , party chairman Yancey McLeod put the ar-
gument for supporting the Johnson-Humphrey ticket in bread-and-butter 
terms: 
I hope that every office-holder, office seeker and the state, city and 
county employees will realize that South Carolina in this matter is a 
two-party state and that a Republican victory in November will almost 
undoubtedly precipitate Republican opposition two years from now in 
the whole political spectrum .... 40 
The most important event of the 1964 campaign for South Carolina poli-
tics , apart from the Goldwater candidacy itself , was Democratic Senator 
35 Ibid . 
36 The State , 20 July 1964. 
37 The State , 30 August 1964. 
38 The State, 16 August 1964. 
39 The State, 28 August 1964. 
40 Ibid. For a discussion of the connection between the state's realignment in presidential 
elections and statewide elec toral change , see Chapter Vin my M.A. thesis , "The Disruption ofa 
Solidly Democratic State : Civil Rights and South Carolina Electoral Change , 1948-1974," Van-
derbilt University, 1975. This thesis - on which the present article is based - was prepared 
under the direction of Professors J. Leiper Freeman and Avery Leiserson , to whom the author 
expresses his appreciation for their generous assistance. 
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Thurmond' s action. Not only did he back Goldwater- he introduced him at a 
Columbia election eve rally - but, the former Dixiecrat switched his party 
affiliation and became a Republican. The passage of the Civil Rights Act had 
proven that his conception of where power lay for the South was superior to 
Senator Johnston 's. (The aging Byrnes also made a campaign appearance for 
Goldwater.) 
Thus , the presidential election in South Carolina in 1964 was dominated 
by race. Bernard Cosman supports this interpretation of the importance of 
race to the Goldwater victory in the state (with 58. 9 percent of the vote), the 
first Republican to win the state's electoral votes since Reconstruction: 
In 1964, the Deep-South vote polarized around race. The Goldwater 
candidacy alienated Negroes, while simultaneously bringing together 
the white voters from all status levels who had been angered by the racial 
policies of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. 41 
As Figure 1 shows, the Black Belt counties gave Goldwater 65 percent of 
their votes, 10 percent more than Nixon received there . In this election, for 
the first time since 1948, the Democratic vote in the Piedmont dropped. Even 
with the 14 percent decline in the Piedmont, Johnson still won a slim majority 
among these counties. Cosman pointed out that throughout the South, Gold-
water ran below Nixon in metropolitan areas. 42 The Metro vote for Goldwater 
in South Carolina, however , rose to nearly 65 percent , a slight increase over 
ixon' s 1960 vote there. 
CORRELATION EVIDENCE OF CONTINUI1Y 
During the five elections discussed thus far, there has been much fluctua-
tion in the Democratic and anti-Democratic vote. However , a degree of 
continui ty can be observed by introducing correlations 43 between the twelve 
candidates who contested these elections in South Carolina. Pearson's 
product-moment correlations between the county-level votes of Truman, 
Stevenson, Kennedy , and Johnson , as shown in Table 1, indicate that in this 
era of change, the Democratic candidates show strong consistency among 
themselves in the patterns of their voting strength throughout the state. 
The consistency on the Democratic side is in marked contrast with a 
similar presentation of th e Republican candidates in Table 2. Comparing 
Dewey, Eisenhower, Nixon, and Goldwater , one is not presented with a 
similar picture of consistency. 
42 Bernard Cosman, Five States for Coldwater: Continuity and Change in Southern Voting 
Patterns (Unive rsity, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1966), p. 90. 
42 Ibid ., p. 57. 
43 Correlation coefficients range from + 1.0 to - 1.0. A coefficient near zero inrucates no 
relationship; a coefficient approaching+ 1.0 indicates a close corr espo ndence between the votes 
of the two candidates in the 46 counties, and vice versa for - 1.0 . For a detailed explanation of this 
technique, see Hub ert M. Blalock, Jr. , Social Statistics, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Co., 1972), pp. 361-427. 
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TABLE l 
Correlations Among Democratic Candidates , 1948-1972 
'48 '52 '56 '60 '64 '68 '72 Wallace '68 
1.0 .68 .60 .63 .70 -.46 -.43 .38 
1.0 .88 .80 .72 -.58 -.49 .75 
1.0 .86 .74 -.57 -.49 .73 
1.0 .82 -.41 -.23 .68 
1.0 -.27 -.17 .48 
1.0 .95 -.60 
1.0 -.49 
TABLE 2 
Correlations Among Republican Candidates , 1948-1972 
'48 '52a '56 '60 '64 '68 '72 Wallace '68 
1.0 -.03 .60 .11 -.21 .36 .19 -.21 
1.0 .05 .80 .72 .18 -.50 -.75 
1.0 .33 .07 .63 .32 -.29 
1.0 .82 .41 -.25 -.68 
1.0 .22 -.18 -.48 
1.0 .52 -.44 
1.0 .49 
a Combines Eisenhower's two slates. 
'48 
'52a 
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TABLE 3 
Correlations Showing Dixiecrat-to-Republican Transition: 
Thurmond '48, Eisenhower '52, Byrd '56, 
Nixon '60, Goldwater '64 
'48 '52a '56 '60 '64 
1.0 .64 .65 .57 .70 
1.0 .86 .80 .72 
1.0 .71 .71 
1.0 .82 
1.0 
a Combines Eisenhower 's two slates. 
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However, when one substitutes Thurmond in 1948 for Dewey, and Byrd 
for Eisenhower in 1956, another pattern of consistency is discernible (see 
Table 3). This series of five candidates may be called the Dixiecrat-to-
Republican transition. 
THE REALIGNMENT 
The correlation matrices in Tables 1 and 2 indicate also that between the 
1964 and the 1968 elections a complete break with past county-level voting 
patterns occurred in South Carolina. The time-series graphs (Figures 1 and 2) 
isolate the major shifts to the Black Belt and the Piedmont counties. Thus, the 
realignment favoring the Republicans 44 evident in 1964 underwent a sharp 
intra-state transformation by 1968, a transformation that continued to favor 
the GOP and that remained stable in the 1972 election. 
The study has shown that the main thrust of the realignment up to the 1964 
election came from the abandonment of the "Southern position" on civil rights 
by the national Democrats and from the presentation of a Republican "choice" 
on civil rights in 1964. 45 The 1964-1968 intra-state transformation - that is, 
the continuation and the completion of the realignment - resulted from the 
substantive impact offederal efforts, led by a Democratic President , to aid the 
Southern Negro. 
In the 1968 election, Nixon carried the state with 38.1 percent; Wallace 
was second with 32.3; and the Democratic nominee, Humphrey, ran third 
with 29.6 percent .. Part of the intra-state transformation occurred in the 
Black Belt counties. The Black Belt went in four years from the lowest area of 
support for the Democratic nominee to the highest in 1968 (see Figure 2). This 
flip-flop was the direct result of the increase in black voting power encouraged 
by the 1965Voting Rights Act. In 1958, 13.0percentof the registered voters in 
the Black Belt were Negroes; in 1968, the figure had risen to41.4 percent. The 
newly enfranchised blacks voted almost unanimously for Humphrey. 46 
The other major part of the intra-state transformation that accompanied 
the realignment process between 1964 and 1968 was the sharp decline of 
Democratic support in the Piedmont, making these counties the weakest for 
Humphrey (they had been the strongest for Johnson four years before). The 
top percentage of the Piedmont vote in 1968 went to Wallace with 41 percent. 
In 1972, with Wallace sidelined recuperating from an assassination attack, the 
Democratic nominee, Sen. George McGovern, did no better there than 
44 While the Republican party 's presidential nominee is the beneficiary of this realignment , 
one qualification is necessary. If Governor Wallace is again a presidential candidate tn the ballot , 
his support will certainly be large in South Carolina and damage the GOP nominee. 
45 Report of the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights , 1959, pp. 572-573; Chester W. Bain, 
"South Carolina: Partisan Prelude ," in William C. Havard , ed., The Changing Politics of the 
South (Baton Rouge, La. : Louisiana State University Press , 1972), pp . 598-599. 
46 Donald L. Fowler , ''The 1968 General Election in South Carolina ," The University of 
South Carolina Governmental Review 11 (May 1969), p. 4. 
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Humphrey. An examination of the 1968 Wallace appeal in these Piedmont 
counties - with their large white blue-collar population - will show, once 
again, the importance of the race issue for understanding electoral change in 
tJ1e state. 
It has not been the approach of this study to concentrate on economic class 
voting (see Footnote 1) through precinct analysis. But precinct analysis is 
useful here to indicate that Wallace's vote in the Piedmont came heavily from 
blue-collar districts. Donald L. Fowler reported that of 82 selected blue-collar 
precincts in the Piedmont, Wallace received 48.3 percent of the vote, Nixon 
29.2, and Humphrey22.5. These same precincts gaveJohnson59.5percent in 
1964 and Kennedy 74.1 percent in the 1960 election. 47 
While this author has refrained from criticizing the interpretations of 
others -choosing rather to present his own Bndings -one exception must be 
made. Chester Bain's conclusion concerning the decline of the national 
Democrats in the Piedmont counties needs to be mentioned because it 
represents the only widely available published reference to this question in 
the South Carolina context and because it is wrong. Bain wrote: 
Because of the low percentage of egroes in the Piedmont counties it 
would seem that some variable other than race caused this continuing 
shift of voters from the Democratic Party to the candidates of other 
political parties. As suggested earlier , that variable seems to be an 
economic one. 48 
It is the contention of this study that Wallace's appeal in the Piedmont can be 
explained in the context of the substantive impact of the civil rights movement 
during the mid-1960s and the reaction by whites in this last stronghold for 
national Democrats to gains by blacks. 
In 1963, there were 365,300 white students and 265,300 black students 
attending public schools in South Carolina. The U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights reported that not one school in the state was racially integrated in that 
year. 49 South Carolina had remained a "legally" segregated society for a full 
decade after the Brown decision. o statistic can possibly convey the tension 
that existed in the state during the mid-1960s or the feelings of both races as 
they attempted to come to grips with a new type of relationship, one decreed 
from outside. For lower status whites in the state there had always been one 
blessing: they were at least above the "colored people." That was fast changing 
and many whites bitterly resented it. 
47 Ibid. , p. 3. Fowler has also written a book dealing with most of the elections covered here ; 
his approach differs markedly from the one presented in this study. See Fowler , Presidential 
Voting in South Carolina 1948-1964 (Columbia , S. C. : University of South Carolina Bureau of 
Governmental Research , 1966). 
48 Bain, "South Carolina : Partisan Prelude ," in Havard , ed. , The Changing Politics of the 
Soitth , p . 611. 
49 Report of the U. S. Commission on Ci.vii Rights , 1963, pp. 64-65. 
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During th e mid-1960s school integration became a reality in South 
Carolina, affecting nearly all formerly white schools , though in many cases 
only in token numbers at first. 5° Federal efforts were begun in these years 
under the Office of Economic Opportunity to assist Americans living in 
poverty ; in South Carolina that meant a great many blacks . In the 1970 census, 
49. 7 perce nt of the state's blacks were classified as living below the poverty 
line. For whites th e figure was 12.3 percent. (Nationally, the breakdown was 
black, 35.0 percent ; white , 10.9 percent. ) Fair employment efforts under 
federal initiative were pushed in behalf of Negroes , particularly in the man-
ufacturing centers of the Piedmont . Although there were fewer blacks in the 
Piedmont than elsewhere in the state, they were still a substantial minority. 51 
Two studies of the Wallace vote elsewhere in the South support the 
conclusion that racism (particularly resentment of Negro gains by whites ) was 
the chief motivating factor for much of the vote the segregationist governor of 
Alabama received in 1968. (Unfortunately , no South Carolina survey data 
exist to substantiate this interpretation. ) Yung Wieand H . R. Mahood used 
survey data to study the 1968 election in Memphis. They concluded: 
Th ere are very significant relationships between racial attitudes and 
the Wallac e vote. People for segregation and opposed to open housing 
and school integration supported Wallace. 52 
Robert D . W1inkle and Jerry L. Polinard, using aggregate data from selected 
Texas counties, concluded: 
We suggest that the Wallace vote, like the Thurmond vote of 1948, is a 
"dissent " vote and that it is closely related to a feeling of hostility toward 
blacks.53 
And Wrinkle and Polinard further assert that Wallace benefited more from 
this prot est vote than Nixon because Wallace provided an alternative for those 
not ready to completely renounce their loyalty to the Democratic party. 54 
It is not the contention of this study that the factors that were so disruptive 
for the national Democrats in South Carolina from 1948 to 1968dominated the 
presidential candidacy of Senator McGovern in South Carolina. They did not 
in a manifest sense. McGovern 's identification with more federal efforts to 
help minorities was sufficient to indicate to many who had voted against 
50 Sot1therri School Desegregation , 1966-67. A Report of the U. S. Commission on Civil 
Rights, July 1967. 
51 In fact, the Negro population of the Piedmont had not declined as rapidly as th e state 
average. For example, in Greenwood in 1950, the population of the county was 30.2 perc ent 
black; in 1970, it was 28.l percent. In Spartanburg , the figures were 22.4 percent and 21.1 
percent . 
52 Yung Wieand H . R. Mahood, "Racial Attitud es and the WaUace Vote: A Study of the 1968 
Election in Memphis ," Polity 3 (Summ er 1971), p . 549. 
53 Robert D. Wrinkl e and Jerry L. Polinard , "Populism and Dissent : The Wallace Vote in 
Texas," Social Science Qt1arterly 54 (September 1973), p . 320. 
54 lbid ., p. 306. 
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Humphrey that they did not want McGovern either, as the election results 
showed. McGovern received only 27.4 percent of the state vote, roughly 10 
percent below his poor national showing and 2.2 percent below Humphrey's 
vote in the state. One can see in Figure 2 that McGovern drew almost the 
same amount of support in each of the four types of counties as Humphrey. In 
fact, the two con-elate at a remarkably high . 95. 
* * * 
This study has stressed differences among counties in order to analyze 
shifts in the South Carolina electorate. It is essential at this juncture to 
emphasize that though there were differences within the state, the Democrat-
ic presidential nominees were overwhelmingly rejected throughout the state 
in the last two elections of this period. The realignment has left the national 
Democrats a decided minority in South Carolina. 
And , by viewing the entire twenty-four year period as a whole , this study 
has demonstrated how the civil rights, or race , issue was at the heart of the 
electora l changes that took place in South Carolina. The circumstances of this 
realignment were perhaps unique , as the entire racial question occupies a 
unique place in American society. But the fury with which the preoccupation 
with race dominated South Carolina voting for president cannot be over-
looked. 
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